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Crisis and Philosophy: Aeschylus and Euripides on Orestes’ Crimes 
 
Abstract : Since the XIX century, a pleiad of philosophers and historians support the idea that Greek 
philosophy, usually reported to have started with the presocratics, lays its basis in a previous moment: 
the Greek myths – systematized by Homer and Hesiod – and the Greek arts, in particular the lyric and 
tragedy literature. According to this, it is important to retrieve philosophical elements even before the 
pre-Socratics to understand the genesis of specific concepts in Philosophy of Law. Besides, assuming 
that the Western’s core values are inherited from Ancient Greece, it is essential to recuperate the 
basis of our own justice idea, through the Greek myths and tragedy literature. As a case study, this 
paper aims on the comparison of two key-works, each one representing a phase of the Greek tragedy: 
The Orestea, by Aeschylus, and Orestes, by Euripides. Both contain the same story, telling how the 
Greeks understood the necessity of solving their conflicts not by blood revenge, but through a political 
way, and also the political drama. Although, in Aeschylus’s one, men still leashed by their fate, while 
the gods play a major role, in order to punish human pride (hybris). In a different way, on Euripides’s 
work men face their own loneliness, in a world fulfilled with gods, each one demanding divergent 
actions. That represents a necessary moment to the flourishing freedom and human subjectivity, and, 
once the exterior divinity is unable to resolve human problems, men will need to discover their interior 
divinity: that is how the Philosophy emerges. 
Keywords: Philosophy of History; Greek Tragedy; Mythos and Logos; Moral Responsibility.  
 
I. Introduction 
Philosophy is considered to be founded by Thales of Miletus, followed by the pre-Socratics 
philosophers.  Those  philosophers  –  the  Ionians,  Eleatics,  Pythagoreans  among  others,   
included  Thales  –  have  undoubtedly  turned  their  world’s  comprehension  and  their  own 
language usage, from a mythological to a logical perspective. The  universe (kosmos) was 
explained not by the mythos, but instead through the logos. And it is amazing that we, living 
two and a half thousand years later, are able to recognize our cores values and ideas in their 
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debates and discussions, especially considering in this early philosophical horizon the brilliant 
contributions of the so called anthropological turn, conducted by the Sophists and Socrates. 
Thereafter the logical (logos) is divided into physis and nomos: namely the nature’s world, 
demanding explanations, and human’s culture world, to be comprehended and constructed. 
To understand how the philosophy emerged is not easy at all. Paradoxically a common 
answer to this question – gave even in philosophical courses – is that by a conjoined sum of 
factors, e.g. the cultural and commercial flourishing in Ancient Greece during that period and 
the liberty to travel and to discuss (a “freedom of speech”), among others, a miracle suddenly 
happened, and that miracle was the philosophy! Of course it is just a simple answer to a 
complex question, which hides a broad range of problems, particularly the non-existence of a 
trustable historical and philosophical data source.
1 Indeed, but this approach is certainly non-
philosophical. 
If the beginning and the core of our philosophy lays its basis in Greece, the occidental 
law was born in Rome. As far as we know it was in Rome that a separation of moral and 
juridical took place and became clear. The law phenomenon has achieved a great autonomous 
life from religion and moral. All this means not only that the  Science of Law
2 develops itself 
there, but also that the principles and the content of our Law (and not only our Private Law) 
was constructed over there.
3 But in philosophical and historical terms, Rome has inherited the 
reason (ratio) from the Greek logic (logos), and its Law was then built on the Hellenistic-
stoics foundations. Considering this, we can honestly ask: in which measure the Romans gave 
us our Law? Which are the Greek contributions? 
The genesis’ problem – or arche, as it is called by the Greeks – of the Philosophy of Law 
leads to obscures situations every time when it ought to be precisely determined, temporally 
or historically.
4 Nevertheless the inner difficulties cannot be an excuse for this important 
search not to be done. Since the 19
th century when G. W. F. Hegel proposed a new approach 
with his dialectical philosophy, appropriated to understand both, the logical and the historical, 
and moreover the development of the logical through history, there is a new possibility of 
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understanding  this  question:  the  unfolding  of  the  consciousness  and  the  knowledge  as  a 
process along the time.
5 
If it this so, then neither the Philosophy had its strictly beginning with Thales nor the 
Science of Law was simply invented by the Romans. There is a historical and logical process 
that went beyond that genial Thales’ phrase – “all is water”
6 – which is both an unifying 
principle of all reality – and the dialectical understood of the unity in the multiplicity and the 
multiplicity in the unity – and a reality’s explanation founded in reality itself. In order to 
comprehend  how  the  Greeks  achieved  such  a  high  level  of  rationality,  Hegel  starts  his 
explanation – in his Philosophy of History
7 – with the Chinese civilization, and goes across 
the Hindu and the Persians to, finally, reach the Greece. 
Even in Ancient Greece a long logic-historical process developed and, before the birth of 
philosophy,  men  advanced  into  a  more  complex,  sophisticated  and  coherent  world  view, 
which can be perceived in arts: painting, sculptures and literature.
8 
Assuming those propositions, it will be our objective in this paper to show how this 
rational consciousness is reflected in two great tragic works, the Oresteia
9, of Aeschylus, and 
the  Orestes
10,  of  Euripides.  They  tell  us  the  same  history,  but  from  a  very  distinguished 
perspective. Due to the time they were wrote, the historical context, the political and artistic 
stream they were inserted, those works are testimony of the profound changes that happened 
in  the  Greek  mentality,  especially  due  to  philosophical  advances.  As  the  tragedies  were 
written to be played to  the general public, and also they had an important role in Greek 
democracy and society, they  function as  a mirror of the Greek  way of thinking. Besides 
highlighting  this  philosophical  issue,  represented  specially  in  how  the  tragedies  were 
constructed, the role of the gods in the drama and how the characters feel and confront their 
fate, those two works have a great interest for the comprehension of both Justice and Law, 
because they tells  us  about  the several  crimes,  committed by Orestes  and his  sanguinary 
lineage. Therefore, relevant points arise about this matter, from causality conceptions to the 
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need of ending the blood revenge and the problem of a direct democracy, as the citizen could 
be conducted in its judgments by the heat of the moment. 
In the following topic, a comparison between the two works will be made, the third topic 
will cover the content about Law, Justice and the emerging philosophy, emphasizing what is 
more  relevant,  and  finally,  in  the  conclusion  our  objectives  and  its  answers  will  be 
summarized. 
 
II. The Works 
Aeschylus was born in 525/524 BC, probably in Eleusis, son of Euphorion, a member of the 
Eupatridae – literally “good fathered” – a group of noble families which ascended back to the 
mythic hero Theseus in the region of Attica. His first dramatic production is dated of 499 BC, 
on the 70
th Olympiad, when it is said that he disputed an agon against Pratinas and Choirilos, 
two older tragic authors. In 490 BC, Aeschylus fought at the battle of Marathon against the 
Persians, one of the events which defined his age
11, and that was of great importance in his 
life.
12 In Aeschylus’ work, the tragic art preserves at the highest degree in the tradition of 
Greek drama its original function of religious cult. The choir still has a certain prominence 
over  the  individual  characters  and  its  role  is  decisive  to  the  outcome  of  the  play
13, 
remembering the ancient form of the dithyramb, the original hymn in honor to Dionysus sung 
by a choir of men and women, from which tragedy arose according to Aristotle.
14    
The  Oresteia  was  performed  in  Athens  in  458  BC,  when  Aeschylus  won  for  the 
thirteenth and last time the first prize on the tragic competition. This work is a tragic trilogy, 
composed by the plays Agamemnon, Choephori (or Libation-Bearers) and Eumenides (or The 
Furies). Besides its artistic and ethical importance, the Orestia is also of great philological 
interest for the studies of the antique culture: it is the only complete trilogy that remained until 
our days.
15 It was also followed by a satirical drama called Proteus, of which remained some 
fragments.   
Euripides, on the other side, was born in 485/484 BC in Salamis, possibly during the 
battle fought against the Persians in this island. He was the son of Mnesarchides, which is said 
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to have been a very wealthy man. However, there are several accounts in ancient testimonia 
affirming that Euripides did not come – as Aeschylus and Sophocles – from a noble family, 
but, on the contrary, that actually his parents were greengrocers.
16 His dramatic production 
began at 455 BC, but only in 441 BC he won his first prize in the tragic agon.  
Euripides grew up during a time of crisis of the Greek polis moral support. By the time of 
his youth, the Sophistic was already a strong movement in Athens. In fact, it is probable that 
Euripides  himself  took  classes  with  great  sophists,  such  as  Prodicus  and  Protagoras. 
Therefore, a generally accepted prejudice of the posterior criticism has taken Euripides as a 
symbolical figure of the Sophistic tendencies of the Greek Aufklärung in the domain of arts. 
Although this view is quite exaggerate, then Euripides also wrote a play such as the Bacchae, 
which is the best example in theater of the cult to Dionysus, it is true that in a general degree 
his work is immersed in a “rationalistic” view of the world, a kind of secular understanding of 
reality that finds its parallel in the moral relativism of the sophists. This results, of course, in a 
problematic relation to the moral and religious Greek traditions. But rather as a simple option 
of the author for a crude view of reality, the work of Euripides should be seen as a diagnosis 
of his own time. It is the symptom of a general “crisis of meaning” in culture that took place 
in the Athens of the 5th century BC
17, derived of the questioning of the moral fundaments of 
the Greek culture.
18  
Maybe because of that, unlike Aeschylus, who fought in battles against the Persians, or 
Sophocles, who served one time as  hellenotamias – the treasurer of Athens – and also as 
strategos –  a kind  of  military  general  in  ancient  Athens  –, there are no accounts of any 
political activity of Euripides during his life in Athens. His relationship to the political life 
and tradition of the polis seemed quite problematic. This can also be seen in his depiction of 
the gods in the tragedy. While in Aeschylus the gods are a recurrent theme in the speech of 
the characters, having a great deal of influence over their decisions, in Euripides it seems that 
they have just a formal place in the tragic world constructed by him, and that men are full 
responsible for their own acts. The contrast of Aeschylus’ piety (sebas) concerning the gods 
and Euripides’ “rationalistic” view of life was also noticed by antique authors. The play Frogs 
by Aristophanes, which relates us a contest between Aeschylus and Euripides proposed by 
Dionysus  himself  in  order  to  elect  the  best  tragic  author,  deals  with  this  fundamental 
difference in the world views of both authors and its relation to the function of poetry and the 
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education of men at the polis.
19 In a famous passage of the play, when the poets pray to  the 
gods before speaking theirs verses, Euripides breaks off with the tradition, invoking his own 
“private Gods”: 
 
“[Dionysus]: Now, both say a prayer before speaking your verses. 
[Aeschylus]: Demeter, nourisher of my mind, grant that I be worthy of thy mysteries! 
[Dionysus]: Now you too take and offer incense. 
[Euripides]: Fine, but I have other gods I pray to. 
[Dionysus]: Your own private ones, newly minted? 
[Euripides]: Yes, indeed. 
[Dionysus]: Well, pray away to these private Gods. 
[Euripides]: O air, my sustenance, and pivot of my tongue, and intelligence, and olfactory nostrils, may I 
stoutly refute whatever words I seize!”
20 
 
This is of course a joke made by Aristophanes, but it reveals how the contemporary Athens 
viewed the works of Euripides, especially in comparison to the theater of Aeschylus, which 
represented the core of the Greek traditions.         
The play Orestes was presented in 408 BC, when Euripides was already an elder author 
close to the end of his career. The play counts among others from his last phase, such as 
Iphigenia at Aulis and the enigmatic Bacchae. It has, of course, a close relation with other 
plays related to the house of the Atreidae, the descendent of Atreus, which are bounded by the 
crimes committed in the past of the family. The other plays of Euripides that deal with this 
theme are the two Iphigenias – in Tauris and at Aulis – and the Electra. 
In  fact,  both  plays  which  interest  us  here  –  the  Eumenides  and  the  Orestes  –  deal 
primarily with the cycle of the house of the Atreidae, that is, the events which occurred after 
the Trojan War, when Agamemnon returned to his reign in Argos. It is generally assumed that 
Agamemnon’s journey back home – which the Greeks called nostos – was quite simple in 
comparison to other journeys, such as that of Odysseus. However, Agamemnon didn’t act 
with prudence at his return, and came right back home, without knowing what he would find 
in Argos after ten years of war. 
The first play of the Oresteia, called Agamemnon, begins with the arrival of the hero at 
home. During his long absence, his wife, Clytemnestra, the sister of Helen and daughter of 
Tyndareus, entered in an adulterous relationship with Aegisthus, a cousin of Agamemnon, 
and  made  with  him  a  plan  to  murder  the  king  and  steal  the  power  over  Argos.  When 
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Agamemnon arrives in Argos, Clytemnestra receives him playing the loving, waiting wife. 
She convinces him to enter the palace and take his arms off, and succeeds in killing the hero 
while  he  was  unarmed  taking  a  bath.  Aeghisthus  becomes  then  the  king  of  Argos,  and 
Orestes, son of Agamemnon, is sent out of the city, while Electra, his sister, is kept in Argos 
as a servant.  
Here the Agamemnon comes to an end. The second play of trilogy, the Choephori, starts 
with  the  return  of  Orestes  to  Argos.  He  arrives  disguised  in  the  grave  of  his  father, 
accompanied by his friend Pylades, the son of the king of Phocis, and makes a pray to Hermes 
in order to help him accomplish his objective: to seek vengeance, by killing the murderers of 
his father – Clytemnestra and Aeghistus. Orestes discovers then that his sister, Electra, was 
also near the grave pouring libations to her father in the company of a choir of servant women 
(the choephori – “libation bearers”). Despite not having at first recognized Orestes, Electra 
quickly notices his footprints, and they get together aiming to revenge their father’s blood. 
After conceiving a plan, Orestes and Pylades go to the palace and announce themselves as 
travelers from Phocis. They also lie, telling that Orestes was dead. Delighted by the news, 
Clytemnestra sends a servant to summon Aegisthus. When he arrives, Orestes reveals himself 
and kills the murderer of his father. Hearing the shouting of a servant, Clytemnestra finds the 
body  of  Aegisthus  on  the  ground,  killed  by  Orestes.  An  agon  takes  place  between 
Clytemnestra and Orestes, and she tries to convince him not to kill her. Orestes faces here an 
impossible decision: in order to revenge his father, he would have to kill his own mother. On 
one hand, Orestes knew the gravity of a blood crime, that is, a crime involving people of the 
same family and blood. On the other hand, he had a religious duty with Apollo, because of an 
oracle sent by the god in Delphi to which Orestes took an oath.
21 Orestes decides then to 
follow the oracle and to kill Clytemnestra. Right after that, the murderer appear alone to the 
audience. He shows the corpses of his own mother and her lover. The Erinyes  – horrible 
women-like figures, netherworld goddesses of avenge – appear then to him, and begin to 
haunt and torture him. Orestes goes away in absolute madness, and the play finishes with the 
choir saying that the tragic events of the house of the Atreidae no longer had an end. 
Euripides retold this same episode, but with some modifications. The play is now called, 
instead  of  Coephori,  Electra.  The  sister  of  Orestes  plays  a  greater  role  in  it,  especially 
concerning the murder of Clytemnestra. This time, Orestes doesn’t have the same active role 
as in Aeschylus’ play, but, instead, it is Electra the one to plan the murder and to assume 
responsibility for it. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Electra does not participate in the murder, 
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and just helps to plan it. In the Electra, when, after the murder, Orestes cries for having killed 
his own mother, Electra answers him: “Too many tears, my brother, and I am the cause. 
Unhappy, that I came to fiery rage against this woman, who was my mother!.”
22 After that, 
Orestes relates that at the moment of execution, afraid to commit the murder, he threw his 
cloak over his eyes. Electra then assumes responsibility for the crime, by saying: “And I 
urged you on and put my hand to the sword together with you.”
23 Euripides manages then to 
solve the problems raised by the murder recurring to a deus ex machina: the Dioscuri, Castor 
and Polydeuces, brothers of Helen of Troy appear at the stage. They tell Electra and Orestes 
that their mother received just punishment but that their matricide was still a shameful act, 
and they instruct both on what they must do to atone and purge their souls of the crime. 
The third and last play of the trilogy, the Eumenides, starts with a crazy Orestes, being 
pursued by the horrible Erinyes. Orestes run away of Argos in order to avoid the Erinyes and 
tries to find a refuge in Delphi, but Apollo, unable to save him from the wrath of the Furies, 
sends him to Athens under the protection of Hermes. When Orestes arrives there, he takes a 
statue of Athena and supplicates for her protection. Despite the claims of the Erinyes saying 
that neither Apollo nor Athena could save Orestes, the goddess of Athens decides to help the 
son of Agamemnon. She intervenes in order to form a jury to judge her supplicant. This jury 
would be composed by the citizens of the city of Athens. Apollo would act as attorney for 
Orestes, while the Erinyes would act as advocates for the dead Clytemnestra. Athena uses the 
opportunity to instruct the people of Athens about the formation of this tribunal. She creates a 
law, stating that each time the result of a jury is a tie, the defendant should be absolved. 
During the trial, Apollo convinces Athena that, in a marriage, the man is more important than 
the woman, by pointing out that Athena was born only of Zeus and without a mother. Athena 
votes last and casts her vote for acquittal. The result is a tie, and Orestes is, in accordance to 
the law early instituted, absolved. Orestes go back home and becomes the king of Argos. The 
Erinyes, on the other side, are transformed by Athena in protectors of the city of Athens, and 
should henceforth be called Eumenides – “the kindly ones” – and honored by the people of 
Athens. Athena also institutionalizes the tribunal of Athens, called Areopagus, establishing its 
rules and giving to it the power to judge to the Athenians.  
Euripides, rethinking this episode, wrote another play about the events that occurred to 
Orestes after the murder of Clytemnestra. This play is the Orestes, which, as have been said, 
was performed in 408 BC in Athens, therefore fifty years after Aeschylus’ Oresteia. It begins 
with Electra’s monologue before the Palace of Argos, which outlines the basic plot and events 
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that have led up to this point from Electra. She reports that six days earlier Orestes killed 
Clytemnestra in order to avenge his father, Agamemnon, but since then he was being haunted 
by the Eumenides because of his mother’s blood. Following that, Helen arrives, aiming to 
make an offering at her sister’s grave. When Orestes wakes up, it is visible that he is still 
under a state of mental illness. After a brief talk to Electra, he has another fit of madness. 
Electra stays by his side, taking care of him. Menelaus arrives at the Palace and starts to 
discuss with Orestes the murder and the resulting madness. Euripides criticizes here Apollo’s 
oracle, by  saying that  Phoebus  showed “a strange ignorance of what  is  fair and  right.”
24 
Nevertheless, Menelaus seems to want to intervene in favor of Orestes, because the citizens of 
Argos would judge him, Electra and Pylades, Orestes’ friend, for the murder of Clytemnestra. 
It is important to notice that in Euripides’ play Orestes doesn’t run right away from Argos 
and, unlike Aeschylus’ Eumenides, there is already a constituted tribunal, responsible to judge 
the crimes committed by him. However, right after that, Tyndareus, Orestes’s grandfather and 
the father of Clytemnestra, arrives at the place and criticizes Orestes severely. The judgment 
against him would be merciless. Orestes supplicates to Menelaus to stay on his side, but his 
uncle is afraid to compromise his tenuous power among the Greeks, who blame him and his 
wife for the Trojan War. Menelaus leaves the place, and Pylades arrives. The friends begin to 
formulate an argument. However, their execution is certain, and together with Electra, they 
plan revenge against Menelaus for having abandoned them. They want to kill Helen and her 
daughter, Hermione. Menelaus then enters leading to a standoff between him and Orestes, 
Electra, and Pylades, who have successfully captured Hermione. Just as more bloodshed is 
about to occur, Apollo appears on the stage, as a deus ex machina, and sets everything back in 
order, explaining that Orestes should leave Argos, then Apollo himself forced him to murder 
his mother, and to go to Athens, in order to be judge at the Areopagus. Menelaus should 
return  to  Sparta.  In  addition,  Pylades  would  marry  Electra  and  Orestes  would  marry 
Hermione. Finally, he tells the mortals to go away and “honor Peace, the fairest of goddess.”
25 
By recurring to a deus ex machina, Euripides manages to solve the impasses of the play, just 
as he did on the Electra. 
 
III. Justice, Law, Revenge and Peace 
In both works a central point is: a) the end of blood revenge – lex talionis, or the crude 
retributive justice: eye for an eye… – and b) the end of the misfortunes suffered by the House 
                                                           
24 Euripides, Orestes (ed. by Arthur S. Way), 1912, 159-60 [417]. 
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of Atreus. Repeating the old disgraces of his family or, better, inheriting it, Orestes had his 
father killed by his mother and her lover, and as retribution, assassinated both. 
To Aeschylus and Euripides, Apollo, the god – or, at least, his oracle –, is as guilty as 
Orestes, because it was Apollo’s wish that Clytaemnestra died. Orestes was just an instrument 
in the hands of to the god, fate and destiny. That arise the question of culpability. 
In Aeschylus’ work Orestes is very conscious of that fate and Apollo’s wishes, and uses 
it  as  an  argument  in  his  plea  to  Athena:  “[Orestes:]  co-author  of  this  [assassinate  of 
Clytaemnestra]  is  Lóxias,  who  predicted  needling  pains  in  heart  if  I  did  nothing  to  the 
culprits”
26. Until the ending of the play, in Euripides’ drama, Orestes doesn’t really know if, 
in  fact,  was  Apollo  who  demanded  the  matricide,  or  if  he,  blind  by  the  hate,  had  a 
hallucination.
27 In deep suffering after his mother’s dead, he is not even sure if his disease 
was caused by the Erinyes or he just suffers for what he did. Considering the absence of the 
gods in Euripides’ play, when Orestes faces his enemies, he did appeals rhetorically to the 
god’s argument
28, but also he faces Tyndareos pointing that, as father of Clytaemnestra, he is 
the guilty one: 
 
“[Orestes:] What ought I to have done? Let plea face plea: my sire begat, thy child but gave me birth – The 
field that from the sower received the seed; Without the father, might no offspring be. I reasoned then – 
better defend my source of life, than her that did but foster me. Thy daughter – I take shame to call her 
mother – in lawless and in wanton dalliance sought to a lover; – mine own shame I speak in telling hers, yet 
will I utter it: – Aegisthus was that secret paramour. I slew him and my mother on one altar – sinning, yet 
taking vengeance for my sire. (…) Thou, ancient, in begetting a vile daughter, didst ruin me; for, through 
her recklessness unfathered, I became a matricide.”
29 
 
The  idea  of  culpability  in  Ancient  Greece  totally  transcends  the  individual  sphere  or  the 
personality – both concepts are certainly inadequate to that time, as the Greeks were still 
submerged in which Hegel calls “the beautiful ethical totality”, in which the citizens cannot 
conceive an opposition between the polis and themselves.
30 The various examples are clear. 
Orestes and his sister, Electra, received the curse and the guilty for previously violations of 
                                                           
26 See Aeschylus (note 9), 109 [465-467]. 
27 See Euripides (note 24), 133 [1666-70]: “Hail, Prophet Loxias, to thine oracles! No lying prophet wert thou 
then, but true. And yet a fear crept o’er me, lest I heard, Seeming to hear thy voice, a Fury-fiend”. 
28 See Euripides (note 24), 72 [592-7]. In the beginning, Electra [27-30] and Helena [74-5] too say that Apollo is 
guilty: “[Helena:] I come, as unpolluted by thy spreech, since upon Phoebus all thy sin I lay”, [See Euripides 
(note 24), 131]. 
29 See Euripides (note 24), 173-5 [551-63; 585-9]. At that time it is believed that the man created the germen of 
the baby, and the woman just involves and nourishes it. In the Aeschylus’ work there is a similar passage. Apollo 
tells that the son is not generated by the mother, who hosts and preserves the germen, generated by the man, See 
Aeschylus (note 9), 120-1 [657-61]. 
30 See G. W. F. Hegel (note 7), 201-2. 11 
the gods’ and humans’ law made by his grandfather, father of Agamemnon, Atreus. The god 
Apollo itself, as argued by Orestes, is also to be blamed. And finally, Tyndareos, father of 
Clytaemnestra, is guilty for giving birth to such a cruel and criminal woman. 
Nevertheless there is a significant transformation in the last work of Euripides. Orestes 
doesn’t really know if his acts were commanded by Apollo or by himself. Because of this, he 
not only blames Apollo and his mother, but also her father, Tyndareos, as the responsible 
ancestor for her violence. The culpability and responsibility is no more a long conversation 
between the gods, as in Aeschylus’ work, in which Apollo and the Erinyes disputed over 
Orestes’ destiny, mediated by Athena, while he just could watch, passively. The discussion 
about the consequences of Orestes crime turned into a matter of how to convince the citizens 
of the justice of his acts. Besides, he no longer waits for his destiny. Instead, he, his friend 
Pylades and Electra made an intelligent plan, in order to revenge Menelaus’ lack of support: 
kill Helena, his beloved wife, and threat Hermione, his daughter. In doing so, as Menelaus is a 
weak man, it would be possible to lead him, the king, to convince de multitude, which hate 
Helena, and then maybe that could save the matricides. 
It is possible to note a huge modification of the terms in which culpability is discussed. 
Not among the gods, not ruled by them, but as a human affair. An improvement such as that, 
although  this  is  still  a  rudimental  notion  compared  to  our  conceptions  of  culpability  and 
responsibility, will emerge with Roman law. 
As well, it can be noticed by the end of both stories that an important meaning relies on 
the end of blood revenge. Whether by Athena’s intervention and Orestes’ judgment at the 
Areopagus  or  by  Apollo’s  appearance  in  Euripides’  story,  giving  a  solution  to  the  fate’s 
bound webs
31, this tragedy is undoubtedly about men releasing themselves of their destiny, 
and the necessary end of the revenge. Notwithstandi ng the destiny question still implicit in 
those works, there are solid arguments to discredit the private revenge in Euripides’ one:  
 
“[Tyndareus:] Debate of wisdom – what is that to him? If right and wrong be manifest to tall, what man 
was ever more unwise than this, he who on justice never turned an eye, nor to the common law of Greeks 
appealed? When Agamemnon yielded up the ghost, his head in sunder by my daughter cleft, - a deed most 
foul, which ne’er will I commend, - he ought to have impleaded her for blood in lawful vengeance, and cast 
forth the home, so from disaster had won wisdom’s fame, had held by law and by the fear of God. But now, 
                                                           
31 At this point, to the reader or the audience, Orestes have just killed Menelaus’ wife (Helena), and is about to 
kill their daughter, Hermione. At the same time, Orestes give the order to Electra to burn the palace, if Menelaus 
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he  but  partakes  his  mother’s  curse;  for,  rightfully  accounting  her  as  vile,  viler  himself  is  made  by 
matricide.”
32 
 
It is a strong argument, and Tyndareus continues reasoning: 
 
“[Tyndareus:] But this, Meneaus, will I ask of thee:- if of his wedded wife this man were slain and his son 
in revenge his mother slay, and his son blood with blood requite thereafter, where shall the limit of the 
horror lie? Well did our ancient fathers thus ordain: Whoso was stained with blood, they suffered not to 
come before their eyes, to cross their path – ‘by exile justify, not blood for blood.’ Else one had aye been 
liable to death still taking the last blood-guilt on his hand.”
33 
 
Considering that in Aeschylus’ work the tension is established between a confrontation of 
Apollo and the Erinyes, the first one representing the new gods and a new mentality, and the 
second ones the antique and old gods, all the debate goes around Apollo’s need of justice, 
consisting  in  the  revenge  of  the  Agamemnon,  and  the  Erinyes’  need  of  revenge  for  the 
matricide. Although the gods trust in Athena, she is not confortable by simple deciding the 
case. She calls then a pair number of judges, leaving to her only a casting vote, made at the 
same time of them – in other words, without knowledge of the scrutiny.
34 At the end, Athena 
had to negotiate with the Erinyes, because they were not satisfied with that conclusion: they 
lose because of Athena’s casting vote. The Erinyes did a long lamentation, and threat to 
abandon the land, leaving it at its own fortune. At first they did not listen to Athena, but then 
the goddess made an offer impossible to refuse: the Erinyes, hated by gods  and mortals, 
would become beloved goddess. The consequence of that would be the reconciliation of both, 
the elder and the Olympic gods.  
Finally, it is possible to oversee how the crisis of democracy had affected Euripides’ 
tragedy.  Different of Aeschylus, who lived during the apogee of Greece, Euripides witnessed 
the democracy’s crisis, caused by multiples reasons, which combined, represented the end of 
that famous political prosperity. Orestes’ trial, according to Aeschylus’ Eumenides, was very 
simple  and  had  no  greater  trouble.  In  Areopagus,  Erinyes  presented  their  claim,  Orestes 
defended himself and, then, Apollo  helped him with  his  testimony.  But  the citizen plays 
another role in Euripides. 
Early in the story’s beginning Orestes is already a prisoner of his own compatriots, as the 
citizen  had  sieged  Orestes,  and  they’re  vigilant,  letting  him  no  chance  to  scape.  But  the 
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tension upsurge in two distinct moments: when Tyndareus claims that Orestes did not follow 
the laws of the polis and killed his mother, and when Orestes, walking on the streets of the 
polis with Pylades, faces the multitude and has a discussion with the people, an event told to 
us by another character, the messenger. 
The  first  appointed  moment,  the  plea  with  Tyndareus,  is  very  ironic.  Tyndareus 
contradicts himself: first he claims that Orestes, killing his mother, didn’t observe the laws of 
Athens. Then he tells Orestes that he must be killed by lapidation for what he had done – but 
that is not what the law prescribes about blood revenge, as Tyndareus did say before. This 
particular case shows in abstract how the argumentation can not only be fallible, but dishonest 
too, leading the demos to do what seems more seductive. A problem of democracy already 
shows its face. 
Orestes’ fear comes into reality as he faces the multitude. Despite the fact of some good 
men taking part in the defense of Orestes, he was condemned to die by lapidation. However, 
somehow he was able to convince the people to let he takes his own life by committing 
suicide. Four orators and Orestes made their speech, representing different personality kinds. 
The first one was Talthybius, a friend not of men but of power, described by the messenger as 
follow: 
 
“Talthybius thereupon Rose, helper of thy sire when Troy was sacked. He spake – subservient ever to the 
strong – Half-heartedly, extolling high thy sire, but praising not thy brother; intertwined fair words and foul 
– that he laid down a law right ill for parents: so was glancing still with flattering eye upon Aegisthus’ 
friends. Such is the herald tribe: lightly they skip to fortune’s minions’ side: their friend is he who in a state 
hath power and beareth rule!”
 35 
 
The next one was prince Diomedes, a fair man who followed the law: “Next after him prince 
Diomedes spake. Thee nor thy brother would he have them slay, but exile you, of reverence to 
the Gods.”
36 
Then, a clearly dishonest citizen rose up, who in fact was not an Argive citizen, but the 
kind of man who disgraced democracy: 
 
“one of tongue unbridled, stout in impudence, an Argive, yet no Argive, thrust on us, in bluster and coarse-
grained fluency confident, still plausible to trap the folk in mischief: for when an evil heart with winning 
tongue persuades the crowd, ill is it for the state: whoso with understanding counsel well profit the state – 
ere long, if not straightway. Thus ought we on each leader of men to look, and so esteem: for both be in like 
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case, the orator, and the man in office set. Thee and Orestes he bade stone to death. By Tyndareus still 
prompted him the words that best told, as he labored for you doom.”
37 
Finally spoke a simple but honest man, an example of someone who does not lose dignity at 
any price: the ideal of a good-hearted man: 
 
“To plead against him then another rose, no dainty presence, but a manful man, in town and market-circle 
seldom found, a yeoman – such as are the land’s one stay, - yet shrewd in grapple of words, when this he 
would; a stainless man, who lived a blameless life. He moved that they should crown Agamemnon’s son 
Orestes, since he dared avenge his sire, slaying the wicked and the godless wife who sapped our strength: - 
none would take shield on arm, or would forsake his home to march to war, if men’s house-warders be 
seduced the while by stayers at home, and couches be defiled. To honest men he seemed to speak right 
well; and none spake after.”
38 
 
As no one spoke after, Orestes made his own speech: 
 
“Twas in your cause, no less than in my sire’s, I slew my mother; for, if their lords’ blood shall bring no 
guilt on wives, make haste to die; else must ye live in thralldom to your wives, and so transgress against all 
rightfulness. For now the traitress to my father’s couch is dead: but if ye shall indeed slay me, Law is 
annulled: better men died straightway; since for no crime shall wives lack daring now.”
39 
 
According to the messenger’s opinion, Orestes spoke well, but the mob did not listen to him, 
and by making a huge effort, “hapless Orestes scarce could gain the boon by stoning not to 
die. By his own hand he pledged him to leave life on this same day with thee [Elektra].”
40 
This picture of democracy could only be drawn in Euripides’ time, as the real Athenian 
democracy was facing all sorts of relativistic rhetorical interventions, which leaded, just nine 
years  after  this  play,  to  Socrates’  death  condemnation.  Another  difference  between 
Aeschylus’ and Euripides’ works is the representation of Dike’s victory at the end of the first 
tragedy, and Irene’s victory at the end of the second. Dike is the goddess of justice and its 
representation on Earth, while Irene is the goddess of peace, which was very important at that 
historical moment. Neither Dike is among the characters in the work of Euripides, nor Irene 
figures in Aeschylus’ one. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Greek  culture  is  the  foundation  of  our  western  civilization,  and  it  is  of  fundamental 
importance that we understand its historical and logical process or, in other words, our own 
development. As we assumed, philosophy cannot be understand simply as a point in time, but 
as an unfolding of the consciousness of reality. The mythos is a part of that process that 
cannot be rejected, and the two analyzed works show how the logical thinking appears in the 
arts. Instead of being works about gods, they are dramas about human beings; a decreasingly 
supernatural  intervention  in  human  life  is  observed;  men’s  attempt  to  solve  their  own 
problems, by their own means; there is an inquietude, due to the inequality of politics; by the 
end,  the  most  valuable  need  is  the  need  of  peace;  evidently,  it  is  an  extraordinary 
rationalization of the causality/imputability, accompanied by the end of blood revenge and 
immanence of culpability. 
Our own dilemmas are not too far from those, besides the gap of two thousand and four 
hundred years separating us from the Greeks. Violence is still a part of our society, and day 
by day we discover and identify new kinds of its manifestation.
41 Religions are very important 
to the majority of men, but also a source of discrimination, pre -judgment and  even war. 
Politics, yet more stable and focused on the person’s protection, are perceived as not being 
compatible with ethics, at least in a huge number of countries, where corruption is not really 
an exception. The 20
th century was not  an example of peace and we hope that the same 
mistakes  are  not  repeated  during  this  century.  The  comprehension  of  the  causality  and 
imputability is still a challenging question to philosophy and science, as well as what to do to 
our penalty and prison system, so inefficient. 
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